Time for decisive steps
T. V. R. Shenoy
“Fool me once, shame on you,” runs an Arab saying, “Fool me
twice, shame on me!” In an age when the most recognised Arab
faces belong to Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and
Yasser Arafat, the cadences of Arabic probably grind on an
American ear. But that does not deny the verity of the
statement.
The United States was quick to urge “restraint” on India
immediately after the attack on Parliament on December 13
last year. The message, conveyed in the most honeyed terms, was to the
effect:
“Give Musharraf some more time to deal with the militants in his country.
If you
weaken his position then his successor will be even more of a hardliner.”
Today, Delhi wants to send an unambiguous message to Washington: “We
listened to you six months ago at our own peril. We have been betrayed
by a
fellow democracy. Under your shield, and taking advantage of your benign
neglect, General Musharraf is up to his dirty tricks once again.”
So, what exactly has the general been doing of late? For starters, he has
reopened the terrorist training camps in Pakistan which were shut down
earlier to
assuage American opinion. Second, he has supplied several ‘volunteer’ students
— anywhere between two and three thousand of them — to these schools. Third,
under Musharraf’s patronage several former Al-Qaeda and/or Taliban supporters
have moved from Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan to its border with India.
Fourth, and this seems to have been part of the deal struck before that
farcical
referendum, three of every four militants who were arrested have now been
released.
Is the US unaware of these facts? Scarcely. American interlocutors have
never
denied the truth of these data when confronted by their Indian counterparts.
The
standard American response has always been: “In these matters we agree
that
India’s information is superior to our own.” Sadly, this is generally followed
by the
same sweet refrain: “But you have to give us more time to work on Musharraf.”
I think we have gone as far as possible along that particular road. The
US’
promises have proved to be flimsy. So, what alternatives does that leave
for
India?
“Exercise all diplomatic options!” says the Left. As ever, it is delightfully
vague as
to the details. The nation best placed to exert pressure on Pakistan is
the US. It
is not going to wag a finger by way of reproof. From Washington’s perspective,
Islamabad’s support is still required to wage the “war against terrorism”
in
Afghanistan — no matter how hypocritical that slogan sounds in Delhi.
The US has put aside 28 billion dollars — a sum comparable to India’s entire
budget — to the fighting in Afghanistan. A chunk of it goes to Pakistan
under the
guise of aid. This is not a carrot-and-stick policy, it is carrots, carrots,
and yet
more Daucus Carota all the way. In essence, the US is prepared to grant
General Musharraf a free hand in Jammu and Kashmir in exchange for his
support in the Afghan campaign.
Is there any other nation which
possesses any leverage in
Islamabad? The Arab world is
consumed by the drama in Israel.
The European Community is
irrelevant. And nobody in India is
going to trust China to play the
honest broker.
If diplomacy hits a cul-de-sac, what are the other options? How about economic
sanctions?
Frankly, commercial ties between India and Pakistan run the gamut between
‘minuscule’ and ‘non-existent’. That does not mean, however, that India
should
not take a good, hard look at the Indus Water Treaty. But the effects on
the lower
riparian areas might take a very long time to become evident — which would
give
ample time for more murders in J&K and elsewhere.
What does that leave? Cultural relations and sports? Pardon me, but I doubt
that
halting cricket matches between India and Pakistan would concern General
Musharraf’s Arab mercenaries for a second!
Practitioners of realpolitik will probably say that there is another option
— to give
Pakistan a dose of its own medicine, in other words, to sponsor terrorism
in that
country. It would not be difficult to find secessionists willing to take
Indian arms
and money in Baluchistan, Sind, and the North-Western Frontier Province.
But
does Delhi have the skill to play that game? I remember how previous
administrations played fast and loose in Sri Lanka, and with what disastrous
results. Anyhow, I think it is bad policy, in the long run, to sup with
terrorists;
history indicates that they always end up biting their sponsors’ hands.
The truth is that India has no choice but to act in a manner that will
bring home
the consequences of his actions to General Musharraf. I hope it does not
come
to that. I witnessed the consequences of war in 1965 and 1971, and the
decades
between have done nothing to dim my memories. So, yes, I hope there is
a
change of heart overnight in Islamabad. And yes, I hope that General Musharraf
renounces terrorism as an instrument of state policy in J&K. But, somehow,
I get
the impression that the general is still calculating that the US will come
to his
rescue.
At the end of the day, it is the US, and not just Pakistan, which is having
a
choice forced upon it. It has already failed the diplomatic test, namely
in ensuring
that matters did not boil over in South Asia. Now, it must face the moral
test: it
must demonstrate that President Bush was serious about waging a crusade
against terrorism across the world.
Several Americans have condemned the wanton killing of women and children
as
terrorism. But are they prepared to take the logic of these statements
to the
natural end? If it is a blunt choice between tackling Musharraf and tackling
terrorism, which way shall the US swing?
In one sense, the answer does not matter at all. India is not prepared
to wait any
longer upon the US’ decision after the bitter experiences of the past six
months.
It will take action, not against the people of Pakistan nor even its government,
but
against terrorism.
If you have read this far, you probably have one question: shall there
be war? My
answer: yes.